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These views, therefore, could not be adopted unless ancient tradition were completely repudiated. It would lead to the conclusion that
it would be wiser to proceed on the premise that every man who is
indicted is guilty of the charges set forth in the indictment, and then
to effectuate this theory, adopt the wisdom of the Queen in "Alice of
Wonderland"-we will have the execution first and the judgment
afterward.
WILLIAM

EDELSON.

ACCOUNTANT'S LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS.

With the growth of any profession or industry to economic importance, there is a concomitant evolution in the law in its application
to that particular enterprise.' Basic principles of law remain the
same, but unforeseen situations demand new interpretations of old
rules. The profession of accountancy has provided us with a question
which, though possessing analogies in the law, has a flavor peculiar
to the auditing field. The increasing use of auditor's financial statements and certificates as a basis for the extension of credit has led to
the query: What is the liability of an auditor who, in a statement, has
certified to the accuracy of the accounts of his client? Does the
accountant owe any duty of care to strangers who extend credit on
the faith of his certificate, or is his sole obligation a matter of contract with his client?
A noted English accountant has said 2 of the auditor's responsibility:
"Although the auditor is responsible primarily to the
shareholders, yet in the light of modern company development
a somewhat wider view should be taken, I think, by the auditor
himself. He should remember that balance sheets of public
companies are, for practical purposes, public documents; they
are studied by the stock exchange and the prospective investor
when forming an opinion as to the value of the share and the
debenture capital; are made available to traders as an indication of the financial stability, and they are used by the companies themselves when raising bank loans and making other
financial arrangements."
Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 62.
Accountant's Certificate in Connection with the Accountant's
Responsibility, J. of Accty., vol. 43, p. 253 (1926).
2Plender,
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More specifically it has been held that an accountant is not an
insurer of the correctness of his statement, 3 therefore, in the absence
of negligence, there can be no liability. If, however, the auditor has
been negligent in his work, he is liable to the person with whom he
contracted, 4 either for the fee if the suit is brought in contract, or for
all the damage that flowed from his fault if the suit is brought in tort.5
With these general rules in mind, let us examine a recent case
which has put the question squarely before the court: Is an accountant
liable to third, persons who have relied upon a statement which he
prepared negligently, and by virtue of which reliance they have been
damaged? In Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven & Company, 6
defendants, a firm of public accountants, were employed by Fred
Stern & Co. to make an audit of their books for the annual period
ending December 31, 1923. The audit was made, and a balance sheet
prepared, the latter being submitted to Stern & Co. along with the
certificate of audit. According to the balance sheet Stern & Co. had a
net worth of over $1,000,000, whereas in point of fact they were
insolvent. Defendants also prepared and gave to Stern & Co. thirtytwo signed counterpart originals of this erroneous balance sheet. In
order to obtain advances on their shipments, Stern & Co. presented
one of these balance sheets to the plaintiff, who, in reliance thereon,
loaned them large sums of money which were lost when Stern & Co.
went into bankruptcy. Plaintiffs instituted an action sounding in
negligence on the theory that the defendants owed them the duty to
exercise reasonable care in the conduct of its audit and the preparation of its statements, and that this duty had been violated. The jury
found the defendants were negligent, and the Appellate Division, by
a divided court, rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff.
Ordinarily there can be no recovery by a third person who has
suffered damage when one of the parties to a contract has performed
his part in a negligent manner. 7 There is a limitation or exception to
this general rule, however, which holds that a person who undertakes
to do an act which will tend to govern the conduct of others is bound
to perform with diligence and care that the other may not be injured.8
The two leading cases in New York are Glanzer v. Shepard 9 and
International Products Co. v. Erie R. R. Co. 10 In the Glanzer case
'Craig v. Anyon, 212 App. Div. 55, 208 N. Y. Supp. 259 (lst Dept.. 1925);
aff'd 242 N. Y. 569 (1926) ; Re Kingston Cotton Mills Co., Ltd., No. 2, 2, ch.
279 (1896) ; Re London and General Bank, LAd., 2, ch. 673 (1895).
'Craig v. Anyon, supra Note 2; Smith v. London Assurance Corp., 109
App. Div. 882, 96 N. Y. Supp. 820 (2nd Dept., 1905).
Sutherland, Damages (3rd ed.), p. 45; Smith v. London Assurance Corp.,
ibid.
, 243 N. Y. Supp. 179 (App. Div., 1st Dept., 1930).
13 Corpus Juris 702, sec. 805, and cases cited in Footnotes 67. 63.
'Wharton. Negligence (2nd ed.), sec. 437, p. 365.
'233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
10244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662 (1927).
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a seller of merchandise asked the defendants, public weighers, to
weigh goods and to forward a copy of the certificate to the plaintiff
buyer, who paid according to the certificate. When it was later found
out that, as a result of the defendant's negligence, the weight was
incorrectly certified, the buyer was allowed to recover his loss. In the
second case the plaintiff, an importer, anticipated goods from abroad
and wished to insure them upon arrival. He inquired of the defendants, who were to warehouse them, where they were to be stored,
and, upon being told, he insured them as being stored there. Instead
the goods were placed on another dock which was destroyed by fire,
and the importer was unable to collect his insurance. Here, too, the
plaintiff recovered, since the defendant, having taken it upon himself
to speak, was under an obligation to do so with caution,
Andrews, J., speaking for the court, states the rule governing
cases of this type:
"Liability in such case arises only where there is a duty,
if one speaks at all, to give the correct information. And that
involves many considerations. There must be knowledge or
its equivalent that the information is desired for a serious purpose; that he to whom it is given intends to rely and act upon
it; that if false or erroneous he will, because of it, be injured
in person or property. Finally, the relationship of the parties,
arising out of contract or otherwise, must be such that in
morals and good conscience the one has the right to rely upon
the other for information, and the other giving the information owes a duty to give it with care.""
These same elements will be found in the decisions of the courts
which have held liable an abstractor who made a search of title at the
request of his client and delivered it to another with knowledge that
it was to be relied upon; 12 though no such liability existed if the
searcher was unaware of the purpose for which3 it was to be used or
the person to whom it was to be communicated.'
The majority opinion in the instant case proceeded on the theory
of the International Products case, viz., that a duty existed towards
those whom the accountant knew would act upon the statement; that
the auditor knew his statement would be relied upon, and that if it
were false, those who relied would be damaged. The dissent insists
that "not only the purpose for which the statement is to be used, but
the person or class of persons who is to rely thereon, must be definite
11Ibid. at 338, 155 N. E. at 664. See also Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong
& Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 N. Y. 377, 381, 157 N. E. 272 (1927).
"Economy Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. West Jersey Title Co., 64 N. J. L. 27,
44 Atl. 854 (1899); Anderson v. Spriesterbach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 Pac. 166
(1912); Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. App. 317. 53 N. E. 779, 72 Am. St. Rep. 308
(1899); Dickle v. Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431 (1890).
"Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195 (1879); Glawatz v. People's
Guaranty Search Co., 49 App. Div. 465, 63 N. Y. Supp. 691 (4th Dept., 1900);
Day v. Reynolds, 23 Hun 131 (1880).
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to the knowledge of the defendants." 14 Certainly this case can be
distinguished from the Glanzer and International Products cases, for
in each of them the defendant communicated his information directly
to the plaintiff, and had exact knowledge of the purpose for which the
information was to be given to the plaintiff. The same was true of
the cases in which a title search was made; when the searcher knew
the person who would rely on his abstract, and sent it to him, he was
liable. 15 None of these cases has held that one who has prepared a
certificate for, and presented it to another, will be liable to a third
person to whom it is shown unless that person or class of persons is
definite to the knowledge of the certifier. Can we say that the plaintiffs here were known to the defendants as a class, that their knowledge that prospective creditors would rely on the certificate would
include the plaintiffs who were specifically unknown?
A more recent case might assist us on the point. In Doyle v.
Chatham & Phenix National Bank 16 the defendant agreed to act as
the trustee of a trust indenture with the Motor Guaranty Corporation
whereby it was to certify that a stipulated amount in notes of purchasers of motor cars had been deposited with it as collateral for the
issuance of bonds. Defendant negligently certified that such notes
had been deposited whereas worthless notes of a different nature had
been received. Plaintiff bought some of the bonds which bore the
certification of the defendant, and lost his investment when the bonds
proved to be worthless. Plaintiff was permitted to recover, not on the
theory of a trust relationship, for none existed at the time the defendant certified to the security, but because, having made a statement
by which they intended to induce action by others, they were bound
to those who relied on it should it prove false.
Here the Court seems to have extended the doctrine of liability
for negligent language beyond previously established limits. Before
this the plaintiff was a definitely known person, now he becomes one
of a class. Though his personal identity is obscure, he is, nevertheless, a dominant figure on the defendant's horizon. He is the target
of the defendant's fire; and though the broadside be aimed at the
mass, it is the individual who is the object of the attack. He is the
one to be convinced and induced to reply.
Our own case is not unlike the Doyle case. The defendant here
prepared and submitted thirty-two copies of the balance sheet, which,
it is conceded, they knew generally would be used for obtaining loans
from banks and others. In the Doyle case the certification of the
bank was sent to the Motor Corporation so that it might be used to
induce investors to purchase their bonds. It can hardly be maintained
that there is a distinguishable difference between prospective investors who are unknown and prospective creditors who are likewise
unknown. Thus it would appear that the intention of the. Court of
"' Supra Note 6 at 185.
12.
'SupraN. Note
Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (1930).
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Appeals is not to restrict the doctrine of recovery for negligent language to those persons only who are definitely known to the speaker,
but to include those who, as a class, would rely on the statement. And
since prospective purchasers of bonds can be characterized as a
specific class, it would appear logical to so denominate prospective
creditors.
As has been well stated elsewhere,' 7 our problem is one of extension. How far are we going to extend this liability for negligent
language? Not every careless remark will give rise to a suit. Whatevet the answer to that question may be, we do not believe that to hold
the accountants in this instance liable would be an undue extension of
the principle. Socially, there are good reasons why the auditor should
be held to a higher degree of care than is required by the terms of his
own contract. He is fully aware of the extent of the faith and credence put upon his work by business men in general, and to relieve him
of all obligation in a case like this is tantamount to saying that he can
be as careless as he chooses and, though knowing of the reliance to be
placed on him, he is, nevertheless, immune from liability. Nor are we
impressed by the argument that if the accountant is held to so broad a
liability he will be driven out of business, since he must charge exorbitant fees to protect himself. One might as well say that because a
taxi-driver might negligently strike and injure a pedestrian, his fare
must be excessive in order to insure himself. The accountant does
not guarantee
absolute accuracy; all he warrants is reasonable care
8
and skill.'
The contention that the audit was only a balance sheet audit and,
therefore, not compreiensive enough for use in credit extension
and should not have been relied on by the plaintiff, is not in accord
with what accountants themselves say on the subject. The sufficiency
of a balance sheet audit already has been attested to by the American
Institute of Accountants in a pamphlet 'o prepared by that body. This
pamphlet was prepared at the request of the Federal Reserve Board
and the Federal Trade Board, and its purpose was to standardize
forms of statements and to provide a program of verification of items
and uniform statements to be used in the extension of credit. Thus
the parent body of accountants in America has put its approval on
the use of a balance sheet audit in credit dealings.
Much has been said of the fact that the certificate purported to
render merely an opinion, and that the accountants should not be
held liable for a mistaken expression of judgment. Had the statement
been issued casually with no knowledge of its intended use, there
might be more force in this argument. But when, as the defendants
here did, there was published a report for others to use and rely on,
this contention loses much of its merit. One had the right to presume
"Smith, Liability for Negligent Language (1900), 14 Harv. L. Rev. 184.
"s(1925) 35 Yale L. J. 81.

" "Verification of Financial Statements," revised May, 1929, U. S. Govt.
Ptg. Office, p. v.
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that the opinion was arrived at by the use of reasonable care. Immunity cannot be purchased by the use of a word or phrase. 20
Suppose, however, that the auditor had no knowledge of the
intended use of his balance sheet,21 other than the cognizance that
such statements are often used to obtain loans. Would he, in such
case, be bound to another who has relied on it? Definite knowledge is
wanting. In fact, his balance sheet might never be shown to another.
All he is aware of is a custom of practice that such statements are,
and have been, so used in business. In this case it seems that there
can be no recovery because it cannot be said that he knows the purpose for which it is desired. 22 One could as easily infer that the client
desired it to analyze his business, and since one view can be taken
as readily as the other, proof of actual knowledge would be required.
THOMAS M. McDADE.

THE VALIDITY OF A

COVENANT OF INDEMNITY

IN

AN

ILLEGAL LEASE.

It is an ancient principle of the common law that no cause of
action may be predicated upon an illegal or immoral contract.' While
this may, and often does, result in allowing a culpable person to escape
liability, the theory behind it is not designed to accomplish this result,
but rather to
2 discourage the making of such contracts, by rendering
them futile.
Montgomery, Auditing-Theory and Practice (4th ed.), p. 466: "As a
general principle of law, an accountant's responsibility for his certificate is not
affected by the inclusion or omission of the phrase 'in our opinion.' The language of an auditor's certificate cannot excuse breach of contract or negligence."
Plender, supra Note 2 at 259; Smith, supra Note 17 at 197.
"In the instant case the jury found that the defendant had actual notice of
the use to which the balance sheet was to be put. This they may have concluded
from the submission of the thirty-two copies of the statement, or from the
auditor's knowledge gleaned from former audits.
Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 Atl. 783 (1919).
'Peck v. Burr, 10 N. Y. 294 (1851); Tracy v. Talmage, 14 N. Y. 162
(1856); Saratoga County Savings Bank v. King, 44 N. Y. 87 (1870); Knowlton v. Spring Co., 57 N. Y. 534 (1874); Smith v. City of Albany, 61 N. Y. 444
(1875); Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558 (1877) ; Materne
v. Horwitz, 101 N. Y. 469. 5 N. E. 331 (1886) ; Hart v. City Theatres, 215
N. Y. 322, 109 N. E. 497 (1915); Burger v. Koelsch, 77 Hun 44 (N. Y., 5th
Dept., 1894) ; Doherty v. Eckstein Brewing Co.. 198 App. Div. 708, 191 N. Y.
Supp. 59 (1st Dept., 1921); Security Mortgage Co. v. Thompson, 66 Misc.
151, 121 N. Y. Supp. 326 (1910).
'3 Williston, Contracts (1920), sec. 1630.

